Power of the ‘handshake’: Kenya’s Democratic Recession; Part Two

Africa has a date with destiny in February 2025. The continent’s 55 heads of state will gather to elect the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), the Union’s secretariat. Since the inauguration of the AU in 2003, the chairpersons of the Commission have come from Southern (1), West (1) and Central Africa (2), three out the five geographic regions into which AU Member States are divided.

To ensure regional parity, the 2023 AU Summit ring-fenced the seat of the Chairperson for the 2025-2027 period to the Africa Eastern Africa region, comprising of 13 countries: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Kenya has high chances of winning the seat. But these risk being undermined by a new trend in post-election politics to reward losers and rivals with appointments or state endorsement to regional jobs as a ploy to avoid executive power-sharing, weaken the opposition and increase chances of the re-election of incumbents.

Kenya should not export its political bad habits that mar and compromise its own elections to the AU.

Despite the hype in the media around the power and prestige of the docket of the Chairperson of the AUC that Kenya covets, in reality the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) envisaged a cog in the larger wheel of AU’s top-heavy governance architecture. As such, the AUC Chair is the cog in a three-tiered power structure. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the supreme organ of the Union, meets twice a year and elects the Commission’s Chairperson and Deputy.

The second tier is the Executive Council made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs which meets twice a year. The Permanent Representatives Committee is the AU more hands-on third tier. Made up of Permanent Representatives to the Headquarters of the Union in Addis Ababa, it meets every month and exercise full oversight of the Commission. Then comes the Commission comprising of a Chairperson, a Deputy Chair and eight Commissioners each serving for a maximum of two terms of four years. The Chair is the CEO, legal representative of the AU and the Chief Accounting Officer. He is directly responsible to the Executive Council for the discharge of his/her duties.

For Kenya to clinch the seat, it must address four core concerns.

First, it has to front and back its best and ablest citizen. Elections in Kenya are marred by the epidemic of fake certificates, which erode Kenya’s respect globally. As a result, some countries are already beginning to blacklist our degrees. Please note, that the four Chairpersons of the AUC between 2003 and 2024 have been “competent women or men with proven experience in the relevant fields, commensurate leadership qualities and a good track record in government, parliament, international organisations or other sectors of society.”

It is now a tradition that the continent’s topmost chief executive and deputy must have a Master’s degree from a recognised institution, with a PhD, command of AU languages and peerage as added advantages.

Second, Nairobi must respect laid-down international standards relating to retirement age. According to the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund, which provides retirement, death, disability and related benefits for the UN and other member organisations, the normal retirement age for active staff is 60 and 65.

Globally, the median age of current national leaders is 62 and 63 for Africa. All Chairpersons of the AU Commission have entered and left office below the age of 70 years. Beyond political rhetoric, Nairobi must be more purposeful and honest about serving Africa.

Third, Kenya should commit to competitively fill jobs in regional and global multilateral organisations rather than dangle them as carrots to win over political rivals and avoid executive power-sharing. The 2010 Constitution rules out executive power-sharing along the AU-brokered Kibaki-Odinga Grand Coalition Government in 2008. In response, the power elite have resorted to a model of power-sharing on a continental scale.

At Kenya’s behest, in October 2018, the AUC Chair, Moussa Faki, appointed Raila Odinga as the High Representative for Infrastructure Development in Africa. And in July 2019, President Uhuru Kenyatta appointed Wiper party leader Kalonzo Musyoka and Odinga’s running mate as a Special Envoy to South Sudan. In 2024, the position of the AUC Chair has entered the power-sharing deal to bring Kenya’s unfinished 2022 electoral crisis to a close.

Kenya appears to be exporting the political culture of rewarding rival and election losers with appointment to government and parastatals jobs to the AU. This carries the risk of filling Africa’s premier organisation with cranks, jokers and weaklings.

Fourth, Kenya should ensure that the candidate it backs for the AU seat is willing and able to serve Africa for a full four-year term (2025-29), renewable to 2033. The AUC chair can neither be a ‘sabbatical’ nor a retirement job.

Fifth, Nairobi should ensure that candidates for the Chair and Deputy Chair do not come from the same region: Eastern Africa. The current AUC Deputy Chairperson, Dr Monique Nsanzabaganwa, is Rwandese, who was elected in February 2021. She is eligible for a second term ending in 2029. Renewal of her mandate will complicate Kenya’s candidature.

Finally, Kenya should audit the positions it holds in the AU to ensure this does not jeopardise its chances for the AUC seat. Notably, in February 17, Ruto was elected replaced Paul Kagame as the AU Champion for Institutional Reform.

Ultimately, Kenya’s shuttle diplomacy in the region seems to be paying off. But should the region’s candidate fail to meet the cut in February 2025, then the Assembly Heads of State will request Faki to stay on for another six months to allow the Eastern region to sort out its mess. When Zuma could not garner the required two-thirds vote in 2012, Jean Ping’s tenure was extended by six months. This will be costly to Kenya’s diplomacy and prestige.

Prof Peter Kagwanja is the Chief Executive at the Africa Policy Institute (API), Adjunct Professor University of Nairobi & Visiting Scholar at the National Defence University-Kenya.