Saitoti’s strange behaviour, Kipkalia Kones’ near punch-up with Raila and Kibaki fallout

This is part 4 of a serialization of Oburu Oginga's book 'In the shadow of my father'. 

In case you missed them, read: How my father smuggled me to Russia

When auctioneers almost drove Jaramogi family into bankruptcy

Kibaki’s first betrayal of the Odingas 

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The merger between NDP and Kanu had divided the independence party. 

Cabinet Minister Nicholas Biwott, the politician who was popularly known as Total Man, was not amused. On the other hand, JJ Kamotho and George Saitoti had never forgiven the Kanu Young Turks for unceremoniously hounding them out of their former exalted positions within the party.

Within the old party order, there were others who harboured ambitions of succeeding Moi. These included Kalonzo Musyoka, Musalia Mudavadi and Katana Ngala. Then there was another large group of experienced politicians who, though not presidential hopefuls, thought it was an unwise idea to be led by a bunch of excitable young men that Moi was fronting. This group was led by sober and experienced voices like Moody Awori, David Musila and William ole Ntimama. 

Finally, there was the former NDP group, which was raring to go to political war with Moi over our convictions for a democratic process in the succession game. Political events were running at breakneck speed. George Saitoti was fired as VP on the 30th day of August 2002 and his security detail promptly withdrawn. I thought Kanu treated Saitoti rather scornfully.

He had been VP for 13 years and here he was whining and complaining to us about his security. We told him that we were also leaders who didn’t have any government security. Saitoti had been in a privileged position for such a long time that maybe he had forgotten how it felt to fend for oneself. But even as Moi fired his VP, he did not sack the other rebels. Moi felt that there was still time to woo grumblers back to the fold and save his project of making Uhuru the President. 

By the beginning of October 2002, Moi had rounded up Kalenjin elders and instructed them to support Uhuru. He then went to North Eastern and managed to get Somali elders to follow suit. Yusuf Haji was the lead man in drumming up support for Project Uhuru in the region. Moi didn’t know what awaited him in his bid to sell Uhuru in other provinces around the country.

***

I remember there was a moment of confusion around October 2002 when everyone finally realised that President Moi was not going to change his mind about handing over the government to his Kanu Young Turks. Mwai Kibaki of DP, Kijana Wamalwa of Ford-Kenya and Charity Ngilu of SDP seemed to have settled on their arrangement for a Kibaki candidacy in an outfit they called National Alliance of Kenya (NAK). In Kanu, the confusion continued as various players struggled to come to terms with what was inevitably coming.

All the elements within New Kanu were now assembled for an explosion. It was the group from Western Province that acted first. Having supported Moi throughout his presidency, they felt that a Luhya should have been given the chance to succeed Moi. This group was led by Moody Awori, Fred Gumo, Moses Wetangu’la and others. They had laid out plans for ditching Kanu before anyone else did. They even had a party called Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). One day they came to our former NDP group beseeching us to join their proposed new outfit.

Although we didn’t have our own party, Raila was still our presumptive party leader and we informed him about the Awori group. Raila suggested a meeting with the group for a possible partnership against Moi’s project. We then reached out to Kalonzo Musyoka and Musalia Mudavadi and invited them to join us. The two were so miffed with Kanu that they didn’t need any persuasion to quit the old party. 

The entire group made a decision to stop meeting at Wetang’ula’s office because of space and convenience. Kalonzo brought Johnson Muthama on board at that time. The latter was a wealthy gemstones dealer who had not dabbled in elective parliamentary politics before. Muthama owned a spacious house in Spring Valley Nairobi, which he easily gave out for our use during meetings. George Saitoti and Joseph Kamotho joined us when we were moving to Muthama’s house. 

When a large group of politicians from Coast Province joined us, we knew it was time to go for the kill by announcing our intentions to the public. All rebels planned to meet on October 11, 2002 and issue a statement critical [of] the President as well as pulling out of government.

Using his intel networks, Moi knew about all our moves so he laid a trap for some of us. Feigning ignorance, he had nonchalantly told Saitoti that he (the President) had heard that the former VP’s security detail had been withdrawn. Moi made it sound as though there were some other powerful elements in his government who had withdrawn his assistant’s security detail without his knowledge.

Suspicious of Saitoti

Saitoti somehow swallowed Moi’s tricks because when we drafted the statement against Kanu and Moi, Saitoti told us he was uncomfortable with our tough language. He wanted us to tone down our stance against his former boss. We refused to heed his advice and there was a brief disagreement. 

Henceforth, some members in our group started to be suspicious of Saitoti and questioned his resolve to stand with us to the end. Saitoti was not used to being in war trenches and he found it difficult to gel with characters who were familiar with the rough and tumble of fighting the government. Our first rally as LDP was held in Kapsabet, deep in the heartland of the President’s support base.

We then left for Kitale, still imagining Mudavadi would follow. He evaded us yet again and was seen being driven towards Kisumu. We were shocked to see him on TV in the evening meeting the President at JKIA. He never picked our calls again. We had all along thought Musalia Mudavadi would be a presidential contender and we were unhappy to see him go. 

Many of his people from Western Province had ditched Kanu for the very reason that they were never given a chance to contest for the presidency. Now the only remaining senior politician from the province was Moody Awori, who said he didn’t think it was right for him to stand for the presidency at his advanced age.

Our job was to see how the presidential hopefuls were behaving on the field, how they were treated by team members, and how rally crowds received them. It was a tricky assignment whose findings were kept away from the glare of the media and supporters. We made our findings very fast but withheld our verdict. Some of the people who were saying they wanted to be President were not even bothered with the logistics of our meetings and public rallies. 

Spoilt political brat

The most interesting candidate was George Saitoti. I vividly remember what happened during one trip to the coast where we had many successful rallies. We scheduled rallies along the way and made taxing detours as we spoke to people and sold our policies. Saitoti did not join us in the itinerary. He instead took a plane down to Mombasa. We saw him when we were leaving the hotel before he popped up to address the huge Mombasa rally we had organised.

Saitoti had not even bothered to know the problems we had encountered along the way. I remember, for instance, Wycliffe Osundwa’s car broke down in Voi and we had to assist him. As an MP seeking re-election in his Mumias constituency, surely Osundwa didn’t have to go through the trouble of roadside meetings and then drive to Mombasa. 

He was doing this solely for the party and to make sure our man won the presidency. Saitoti didn’t even know where we got rally stuff like tents, seats and a public address system. He was not aware of where and how members of the entourage ate or slept. He was like a spoilt political brat. He went straight to the airport after the successful Mombasa rally held at the Tononoka grounds.

In another campaign trip to Garissa, Saitoti came in a chopper, addressed the meeting then boarded his plane back to the city. He did not know that we had made stop-overs to address many meetings along the way, including Mwingi town. He hadn’t also known the frustrations we went through when organising subsequent rallies. 

The fact that he was the wealthiest man in our group made the matter more depressing. In the meantime, Raila was leading the campaigns and shouldering most of the burden of making tough decisions on logistics. At some point, our committee almost got fed up and decided not to have Saitoti as our presidential candidate. We did not share this information with Joseph Kamotho because we knew his close friendship with Saitoti. In fact, I thought Kamotho had been telling Saitoti that he was still top on our list. Saitoti’s supporters were also very impatient and they wanted instant answers regarding their man’s candidacy.

William ole Ntimama, another close Saitoti supporter, didn’t mince his words about his feelings. In one of our closed door meetings in Serena Hotel, Ntimama pointed a finger at me and demanded to know the findings of our committee. 

I could feel that Ntimama expected me to endorse his man there and then. Talking tough, he threatened to abandon us and join Mwai Kibaki if he was not getting any answers from us. At this point I didn’t have a choice but disclose our findings. I told Ntimama everything, adding that Saitoti should know that he is now in the opposition and that he must not expect DCs, DOs and chiefs to come and arrange everything for him.

“People in opposition fend for themselves, fight their own battles and organise their own events without outside help,” I added.

At rallies, I told Ntimama how Saitoti allocated himself prime time on the list of speakers yet he didn’t contribute like others. On the other hand, he was somehow imperious towards other members of the team. I rested my case by stating that we could not replace one dictator with another. Of course, William ole Ntimama was not bursting with joy when he heard what I said about his friend.

I then asked Joab Omino to have his say because he was also a member of our group. Omino made it worse. 

He pointedly asked Saitoti: “If you believe Moi thought you were the best politician when you were fished from the university and made Kenya’s vice-president, then why did he drop you?” Omino posed to Saitoti.

“Why did you clap when Moi humiliated you and said you were not fit to lead this country, If Moi thinks you’re not a smart guy after serving as vice-president for 13 years, why should we?”

You could hear a pin drop on the carpet when Omino finished speaking. Even Ntimama was no longer protesting and pushing like before. Raila broke the silence by observing that we had driven ourselves into an impossible position. It was unacceptable for seasoned campaigners to find themselves in the situation that we were now in. He said that if things remained the way they were, Moi and Uhuru Kenyatta would troop back to State House.

Raila was pragmatic enough to inform everyone that the only option we had was to join Mwai Kibaki or wait for Moi to defeat us like he did before. Everyone, except Saitoti supporters agreed that we must join Kibaki. Joseph Kamotho was the most vocal against the idea of joining Kibaki. As we left, no agreement had been reached. We, however, all agreed to attend a huge rally planned for the next day at Uhuru Park. It was October 13, 2002.

***

National Rainbow Coalition. What had been a one man’s bid for consensus was now a rallying call that reverberated across the country. Kibaki Tosha! Raila had not confided to anyone what had been up his sleeve as we went for the big Uhuru Park rally. He had spent the previous evening speaking to NAK leaders like Charity Ngilu and Kijana Wamalwa, asking them to attend the rally. They all agreed, except Mwai Kibaki. It took a lot of persuasion to convince Kibaki to come to Serena Hotel and cross the avenue to Uhuru Park.

Never before had a king been so unwilling to attend his own coronation fete. While the NAK brigade was all praises for Raila as we left Uhuru Park and our own LDP group as well, not everyone was amused. Kanu had never panicked since it was founded as it did on that day. Special fury emanated from the Ford- People group, the party now being led by Simeon Nyachae. We had earlier agreed on a working formula with Simeon Nyachae, a position the Ford-People leader still insisted was valid. Nyachae wanted Raila to support him, especially since Raila’s support was going to help him secure all the Nyanza votes. He was no doubt a veritable candidate in his own right, with experience, drive and lots of his own money for campaigns.

As we left Uhuru Park, even Ntimama, Kamotho and Saitoti supported Kibaki. Although nominations had not been done and the new outfit was not even properly constituted, everyone knew Mwai Kibaki would be the joint candidate for the entire opposition group now loosely called Rainbow.

We badly wanted Nyachae to join us, but the Ford-People leader insisted on us conducting nominations through universal suffrage. His proposition presented a huge dilemma because we neither had the time nor the organisation to effectively conduct such an exercise. Moreover, he insisted that his decision to join Rainbow must first be ratified by an executive conference of his party. Some of us had no time for people with big egos.

As we left Uhuru Park, a few of us agreed to meet at Raila’s house in Runda. Kipkalya Kones, Nyachae’s top lieutenant, followed us. He was so annoyed that when he burst into Raila’s home he went directly for Raila. It took us time to realise that Kones was heading to punch Raila. It was a season of high emotions and Kones had clearly blown his top.

To assault a man was one thing, but to assault a man in his own home was another matter altogether. We quickly reached out to Kones and tried to cool him down before he left, fuming and shaking his head repeatedly. A few days later, I heard that Kones punched somebody at Moody Awori’s residence in Lavington. It happened when Awori tried to reconcile the various parties represented in the new National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (Narc), the new entity formed by LDP and NAK.

Kanu loses

The entire Narc team was in high spirits, with expectations across the country sky-high. It was time for our country to have a new beginning. For the first time in Kenya’s history, Kanu was out of power. Mwai Kibaki and Narc won with over sixty-five percent against Kanu’s Uhuru Kenyatta. By the time ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu announced the results, Kenyatta and William Ruto had long called their own press conference to concede defeat. 

Kenyatta’s running mate, Musalia Mudavadi, who had been Moi’s vice president for sixty days, did not even show up for the concession press conference. 

After the momentous swearing-in ceremony at Uhuru Park, most leaders joined the new President at State House for a luncheon. At some point, I walked towards where Kibaki was seated to congratulate him but amazingly I was pushed away by his security personnel. I was used to travelling and walking with Kibaki everywhere before and during campaigns. Within hours, things had changed and I could not just believe it. 

Kibaki himself was watching the drama as his people pushed me away like a loafer. He kept quiet and did nothing. It dawned on me that a great betrayal had just happened and shortly something would go terribly wrong. Per the MoU, Michael Kijana Wamalwa was now the new vice president.

Immediately after the luncheon we went to Nairobi Club to meet other LDP legislators and discuss a way forward. One of us, Moody Awori, had been the chairman of the top Narc campaign organ called the Summit. We had earlier agreed that we would submit our names to Moody Awori, who would take them to Kibaki for inclusion in the Cabinet. 

The MoU was very clear on the portfolio balance, even though particular names were not inserted. Later, Moody Awori informed us that Kibaki had accepted the list and that we should wait for his announcement. Interestingly, we found Ngilu there, complaining that we were forwarding our names while hers had not been considered either. 

To our consternation, Kibaki announced the Cabinet without paying heed to our agreement. It was as though the MoU that brought him to power never existed. Out of the list we gave, only Raila was asked to choose which ministry he wanted to head. He chose the Ministry of Roads. Some LDP members, namely Raphael Tuju and Ochilo Ayacko, had not been in our list but were now made Cabinet ministers. In a meeting that followed with the President, I raised my hand and informed Kibaki that we would be in trouble with our supporters, especially in Nyanza, because they had agreed to support Kibaki and Narc on the promise that Raila would be named prime minister. 

Kibaki mumbled something in his characteristic murmuring style but I could decipher something to the effect that he was certainly not going to have two centres of power in his government. I did not want to believe what I thought he said. I asked Kibaki to come to Nyanza and try to explain to our angry supporters what he told me, and he said he would come. But that was the end of the matter. 

The new Cabinet was to be sworn in on January 6, 2003. A day before, I joined Joseph Kamotho, Gor Sungu and Mutinda Mutiso in a press conference, where we told our supporters that LDP had been short-changed in the new arrangement. The next day, as Kibaki witnessed the swearing-in of his Cabinet, Kajwang rounded up 24 Narc MPs and loudly complained that Kibaki and his NAK wing of the coalition had trashed the MoU that was basis of the entire Narc dream that brought the country together. The Narc journey had started on the wrong footing. The rickety juggernaut that removed Kanu from power could only creak and tweak on its way towards imminent disaster.

Contentious draft Constitution

After the Narc victory of 2002, the CKRC (Constitution of Kenya Review Commission) was reconstituted in 2003, now meeting at the Bomas of Kenya. The CKRC draft of 2002 formed the basis of the talks we were involved in at the Bomas. The NAK side of government wanted to take the Bomas Draft to the AG immediately for ratification. But trouble started when some people went to court, and on March 23, 2004 the High Court blocked the CKRC from taking the Zero Draft, as it was initially called, to the AG. 

Five days later, another group went to the High Court and secured orders barring Parliament from discussing the draft until Section 47 of the Constitution had been amended. 

The following day, members of LDP, Kanu and Ford-Kenya met to explore ways of negotiating around the two High Court rulings. Essentially, the process seemed to have hit a wall after years of struggle, effort and even bloodshed. President Kibaki met MPs at State House twice later in the same week but no broad agreements were reached. 

In May, a large consultative meeting was held in Mombasa. It was supposed to be the mother of all meetings, with all MPs and the President expected to attend, but it was a monumental flop. Only 25 MPs absented themselves with apologies. Tellingly, 96 others absented themselves without apologies. I was among those who skipped the meeting. Yet it was from this meeting that was absconded by more than half the MPs that resolutions were reached to hand over the Bomas Draft to AG Amos Wako for ratification. 

The draft Wako prepared, called the Kilifi Draft, named after the area where Wako retreated with his team to prepare it, was neither agreeable to most of the legislators in Kenya nor to the majority of the delegates in the CKRC. 

In a nutshell, that was how we arrived at a contentious draft that was pushed for a referendum scheduled for November 21, 2005. The ECK gave the orange symbol for those who opposed the draft and a banana symbol to those who were campaigning for the draft. Campaigns proper started towards mid-2005. From the beginning, the banana team reckoned with a bigger rebellion from its rank and file than its predecessor Kanu. 

Leader of the Official Opposition Uhuru Kenyatta teamed up with LDP to form a broad team of seasoned politicians who felt the Kilifi Draft was wrong for Kenya. Instead of devolving power and resources from the centre, as leaders had been promising Kenyans for over a decade, the proposed Constitution seemed to have added more power to the centre. The document also seemed to have skirted around the land problem, which was one of the most contentious issues in the country.

The last and biggest meeting of the orange team was held at the Kenyatta Sports Grounds in Kisumu. The boisterous crowds, the infectious air of camaraderie and the sense of purpose in our team were so pervasive that we knew we wanted this thing to continue even after defeating the banana team. It was Najib Balala, who had been leading the Coast campaigns, who first came up with the idea that we could form a permanent union out of our orange camaraderie. I remember seeing him going around talking to Raila, Kalonzo, then Uhuru Kenyatta, urging them to turn the orange agenda into a movement and political party. 

It sounded a very opportune moment for such an idea and the others agreed. One main reason why most leaders felt we needed an orange movement to canvass our agenda into one vehicle was that we came from different political parties. Our colleagues from Kanu had made it clear that even if we collaborated, they would never abandon their party for LDP. Both Kenyatta, who was the chairman of Kanu, and William Ruto, who was the secretary-general, had said they were willing to work with us in a new outfit where all of us were insiders. 

When the suggestion was floated to form an orange movement, it seemed to be just the medicine the doctor ordered. We decided to form an outfit called the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) by the time we won the referendum by 57 per cent of the total vote against 43 per cent received by the banana side. 

President Mwai Kibaki was stunned. He immediately dissolved the Cabinet and fired ministers who opposed the draft Constitution. He then raided Kanu and appointed their MPs to senior positions. The Kanu beneficiaries included Njenga Karume, who was appointed to the Cabinet even though he campaigned against Narc in 2002. Karume and Kibaki were old buddies and now they were reconciled. 

Kibaki then reached out to Ford-People and took Simeon Nyachae and Henry Obwocha. Nyachae was excited because he found an opportunity to sneer at us for throwing him under the bus in 2002. He then ordered the government chief whip, Norman Nyagah, to kick out Orange members from key parliamentary committees. An enterprising lawyer called Mugambi Imanyara had gone ahead of us and registered the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as his own party, complete with the single orange symbol that we had used during campaigns. We had to settle for the name Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K).

Suspicious reports

As we entered 2007, a large group of leaders had declared their interest in running for the presidency. Musalia Mudavadi had learned from his political acrobatics of 2002 and was now with us. One of the key LDP leaders, Moody Awori, could not join Orange because he was the vice president. Others who wanted to be President under an Orange banner included Najib Balala, Joseph Nyagah, Kalonzo Musyoka, Uhuru Kenyatta, Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto and Raila Odinga. 

A group of elders were asked to form a committee under the chairmanship of Fred Gumo. They were supposed to interview and vet all prospective candidates. I was a member of that group. We decided to meet at United Kenya Club and invite all our presidential hopefuls for vetting. I remember interviewing Ruto, Kenyatta and Balala. A small group was selected from our group to further speak to the presidential candidates in private. 

This smaller group was chaired by David Musila and I remember Chris Okemo and I were also members. As deputy Speaker, it was easy for Musila to acquire a committee room inside Parliament, so we decided to rely on him whenever we wanted to speak to a presidential candidate in private. It didn’t take us long to discover that, while other candidates were strong in certain areas, Raila and Kalonzo were the main contenders for the presidential ticket. Kalonzo was especially adept at beating his own drums. With his confidante Musila as our chairman, we knew he would be a little biased towards his friend.

There were also suspicious reports being circulated, complete with opinion polls showing Kalonzo was the most popular politician in Kenya. Some intelligence officers at the NIS had done impressive calculations based on propaganda and circulated reports indicating that Kalonzo had euphoric support in Ukambani that could not be transferred to another candidate. The papers also said Raila had euphoric support from his support bases, and that he was capable of transferring that support to another candidate. 

The reports, some of which were picked up by journalists, were calculated to convince ODM-K to nominate Kalonzo Musyoka as its presidential candidate. The PNU side knew that if we picked Kalonzo they had a chance of beating us in the polls. The larger group from which we were selected was growing impatient with us because Kalonzo and Raila seemed to be pulling in different directions. Their style of campaigns was markedly different. The group of elders wanted recommendations but we didn’t have any yet. It was now mid-2007 and I personally felt we were running out of time. I remember Nyiva Mwendwa passionately appealing to Kalonzo and Raila to pull together. Her appeal was timely, even though we knew she privately favoured Kalonzo. 

One day, my team decided to summon Raila and Kalonzo to Karen Country Club for a talk. 
The two had been to Addis Ababa together and when they arrived they were in high spirits. When we sat down, Kalonzo started saying how he was willing to die for his ‘brother’ Raila but he didn’t know whether Raila was willing to die for him. They spent a great deal of time trading pleasantries but I informed them that their polite pleasantries weren’t helping us very much in deciding who would be the next President of Kenya. In the end we agreed that Musila and I would analyse the situation, draw some recommendations and then report to the duo and elders. We insisted that everyone should abide by our recommendations. 

Tomorrow in the Daily Nation: In the last instalment of Oburu’s autobiography - When Ruto-Raila differences began, Kivuitu’s links with PNU, how US ambassador asked ODM not to let IEBC announce results, minister who confirmed presence of Ugandan troops in Kenya and working with Uhuru Kenyatta.