Karangi: It took eight months of planning to roll into Kismayu

Thank you, Sir, for agreeing to speak to us. What have you been up to since you retired as Chief of Defence Forces?

I am a happy Kenyan, just as patriotic as I was in office and obviously doing other things, both personal and nation-building. I have also focused on catching up with my life. In that former life, you try to set aside all that is personal and give it your all. The appointment of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) is officially a four-year duty and I was appointed the CDF on July 13, 2011 and I handed over on May 4, 2015.

Before that, I was the Vice Chief of General Staff as there was no CDF. The introduction of the acronym KDF was in the 2010 Constitution and I had served as the Vice Chief of the General Staff for six years, up to the time I took over as the CDF. Before that, I was the commander of the Kenya Air Force from 2003 to July 2005.

Before that, I was the commandant of the Defence Staff College as a Major-General from the end of 2000 to 2003. That is how far we can go back, but we could go back further. I mentioned the tail end of my career deliberately because I came to understand how unique top military management is in military organisations and KDF is not an exception.

I am now enjoying life in a very patriotic manner. I am the chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Social Security Fund, the biggest social fund in the region. I am also a director of the National Bank of Kenya and many other things. At a personal level, I enjoy farming.

Let’s talk of Operation Linda Nchi, Kenya’s war in Somalia. What were some of the tough decisions you had to make before you sent troops to Somalia?

Those kind of decisions do not come easy because you are talking of mobilising the entire population to fall behind the national effort. It was not about me but the Kenyan people. When you read the history of this country, you’ll notice there has never been peace between us and our eastern neighbour.

Six months before independence was when the Shifta raids began in Isiolo. It was very hard because we were not only convincing my senior, the Commander-in-Chief but also the political class and the general public. 

When I became the CDF in July 2011 I had a very short time to arrive at that decision, but it had to get the authorisation of the National Security Council and MPs. I told the President the one thing I knew since I joined the military was that we had very well educated and trained rank and file people in the military and there was nothing we did not know. We were getting a budget every year from the Kenyan taxpayers and the justification of that budget is that we are the ultimate defenders of the Republic. Constitutionally, the CDF is mandated as the principal security advisor. 

When the international community has failed to defend any nation state and there is sufficient justification for the right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, any nation state has a right to defend itself to the extent that it can produce that justification.

Between 2005 and 2011 Amisom existed in Somalia but Kenya was continuously attacked in all manner, such as the kidnapping of government officials, NGO workers, as well as KDF personnel. It was also quite clear to Kenya that despite hosting Somali refugees in Dadaab, the largest refugee camp on earth at the time, there was sufficient evidence that Al Shabaab had entered that refugee complex and launched attacks from there.

It is on that basis that we gathered the best legal minds, both in the military and government, to guide on how to proceed all the way the UN Security Council, not to ask for authority but to inform them of our intent to defend ourselves inside Somalia. Case studies were there to support our move to invoke the Article. 

As this process was going on through the African Union and the UJSC, and as the Commander-in-Chief was opening the Nairobi International Show in early October 2011, Al Shabaab struck again and kidnapped KDF personnel and their trucks near Dhobley.

I received that urgent information just as we were about to enter the Jamhuri Stadium to open the show. I had a very brief discussion with Kibaki and I requested him to allow us to pursue the Islamists as they were within sight and it was getting late in the day. He quickly authorised. By the time the show was ending close to 6pm we had recovered our people and the trucks and I accordingly informed him. 

We then had to take our plan to parliament and there was a vote. Only two MPs dissented. The decision was taken to the African Union where it was quickly accepted and onwards to the UN Security Council. As this was going on, planning was in top gear on the part of the military. As a result of all these efforts, the KDF formally crossed the border into Somalia on October 14, 2011. 

Were there doubting Thomases at the top decision-making levels before Operation Linda Nchi?

Yes. There were those who opined that we were just a ceremonial force and career peacekeepers. Some of them dismissed us by asking: ‘How can they enter Somalia during the rains?’ But we knew that we had a comparative advantage over Al Shaabab in terms of firepower and mobility. We knew we had every advantage that would put the enemy at disadvantage in any means. We would get stuck, but they would get stuck more. 

By the end of 2011 Kenya was approached from several quarters to join Amisom. We had no problem in joining but also knew that would invoke another process. Kenya accepted the request from the African Union and through UNSC Resolution 2036 of February 22, 2012, formally authorised the KDF to be part of Amisom. 

As a result of what KDF managed to do between October 14, 2011 and the end of 2011, and having captured a lot areas previously occupied by Al Shabaab inside Jubaland, this request for Kenya to join Amisom did come to us as a surprise because success begets success. 

What were your expectations as you set off for Operation Linda Nchi? Did you expect a long war or a short one?

We did not cross the border into Somalia expecting a prolonged stay there but primarily what threatened the sovereignty of this country then was the presence of Al Shabaab in Jubaland and Gedo. The targets we went for were primarily from those two regions. But we would still be there until Kenyans felt safe irrespective of how long we stayed there. Conceptually, the shorter the war the better and the best victory is one you achieve without having to fire a bullet. The longer you stay the more fatigued people become, and of course war is expensive. 

The capture of Kismayu was one of the most successful phases of Operation Linda Nchi. What are your reflections on this operation?

My point of entry into that question is to put Kismayu into context. It is like 200 miles (about 320 kilometres) between Kismayu and Mogadishu. Kismayu was the headquarters of Al Shaabab and there had been many attempts before to dislodge the terror group. It is a huge seaport and was the point of entry of all Al Shaabab weapons, supplies, and all that. 

Before the entry of KDF into Somalia, Kenyans may recall that there had been so many piracy activities in the Somali Basin all the way down to Mombasa and beyond. In between Kismayu and Mogadishu, there were small ports in the control of piracy. Two of them were the ports of Marka and Erlye, and, of course, Kismayu. 

Kismayu, therefore, was the headquarters of Al Shaabab in all respects. We also knew from intelligence there was a very clear nexus between piracy and Al Shaabab activities on land. Before we entered Somalia, hardly a week would pass without the hijacking of a ship, maybe an oil tanker, and that would be followed by a ransom demand.

Piracy had clearly become part of organised international crime despite the presence of other naval forces. This slowed down world commerce and marine insurance just spiked. That affected our economy here. So even as we were entering Somalia on land, we were also concurrently dealing with piracy in the Indian Ocean. 

The Somali government then had planned to hold elections on August 20, 2012 under the federal constitution they have to date. From the Summit level of the entire Amisom troop-contributing countries, and by extension the KDF, it was agreed that Kismayu had to be captured before the elections, or else it would disrupt the process.

You know, people are not very clear on when Amisom was formed. It was formed in 2005 and we were now in 2011. If you look at the records documented in the book we wrote (Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya’s Military Experience in Somalia), the insecurity in this country became so serious between 2005 and when we entered Somalia. The Amisom between 2005 and 2011 was staying in Mogadishu only. Many people do not know that.

When I became CDF we formed as small club of CDFs and met every month in Addis-Ababa at the headquarters of the African Union. We agreed that Kismayu had to be captured before August 20, 2012 to safeguard the elections. We were instructed by the Heads of States of the countries participating in Amisom to plan on how to capture Kismayu even though it was in the KDF sector. Why? Because of the historical importance attached to the capture of the port. Nobody had done that before. 

The KDF hosted a meeting in Nairobi at our International Peace Support Training Centre in Karen on January 18, 2012. In that meeting it was agreed that KDF was to formulate the operational plan for the capture of Kismayu to be launched jointly with Amisom’s troop contributing countries. We accepted and got all our top commanders to come up with up a strategy. 

The last meeting came a month and a half to the elections in Somalia and after the presentation by KDF, the other countries, for lack of better words, pulled out. Kenya was left with the burden of capturing Kismayu alone. 

We could not capture the city alone before the elections because of many considerations. We took the matter back to the National Security Council and explained that there was no possibility of capture. But we gave the assurance that we would capture Kismayu before the short rains in October.

To cut a long story short, we launched a very successful operation using the entire battle space — land, air, sea, information andintelligence — and landed on Kismayu on September 28, 2012. We neutralised Al Shaabab without losing a solider, not even one was injured. Like Sun Tzu said in Art of War in 2500 BC, the best victory is the one you get without firing a bullet.

Would you say that was the highlight for you in Operation Linda Nchi?

In my view, of all the battles documented in our book, none of them was easy and they all had their challenges. Of course, Kismayu, when you talk about the highlights, is at the top there because of its significance and the global attention it garnered.

But that did not signify the end of the war. The Al Shaabab are still there, but they are not very strong. Before our entry they had moved from being a radicalised group to a fairly well-equipped fighting force. What you have is a fourth generation warfare, also referred as asymmetrical warfare or war among people.

When you are fighting an insurgency, you know the insurgents are among the people, like the Mau Mau. You do not fight in the same way you would fight in a conventional warfare. The biggest hurdle is winning the hearts and minds of the citizens in that country. In other words, kinetic energy is not the determinant of victory. The winning of the hearts and minds of the wider population is a key effort. That is what we did then and the KDF continues to do today. 

In winning the hearts and minds of a people we include reconstruction of broken infrastructure, medi-care, building of schools and educating the general population. 

What did it take in terms of planning for the capture of Kismayu?

In Kismayu we had a total of 14 targets allocated to various elements of the KDF. There was a lot of training and rehearsals and extremely high levels of operational security. Amphibious operations by their very nature are very complex operations, whether you are talking of the Normandy landings in World War II, the Incheon landings of the Korean War in the 1950s, or even the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. 

When you land there, you are only trained for this particular target. Deception is among the ten principles of war. You may think I am coming through that door but I will come through the gutter. That is called deception.

When we eventually captured Kismayu, all the Heads of State on this planet were meeting in New York for the UN General Assembly. There was a lot of appreciation on the part of Kenya for having launched an amphibious operation. That was a very welcome achievement to the global community. 

You have said the Amisom colleagues never reached out to you after the successful capture of Kismayu, what about the others?

They did not, and I did not expect any of them to reach out anyway. But of course at times we bumped into each other but never spoke about it. On behalf of all the three services, I received a top medal from the USA, the Legion of Merit. I am the only one with this award in this country. I flew to the Pentagon to receive this medal in July 2014. The medal was created in 1942. The only recipients in the continent include Emperor Haile Selassie for defeating the Italians and Archbishop Desmond Tutu for struggle against Apartheid.

You have also said that the AU pleaded with KDF to join Amisom. As you were preparing to go to war, was joining Amisom at a later stage one of the options?

Our entering Somalia was motivated by the defence of national interests. Even if we had not joined Amisom we would still be doing the same thing in pursuit of our national interests. But joining Amisom was also a welcome move because it relieved Kenyans of the burden of having to foot the cost, and also in keeping with the traditional recommendations of being very good in peacekeeping missions we demonstrated what we have always done, not just in Africa but also in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. 

Human rights groups have accused KDF engaging in illegal trade, such as selling charcoal, sugar and also committing human rights abuses, in Somalia. What do you say about these accusations?

We are known as a military organisation that punishes its own people because of the high level of training. If you smoke bhang in the military and you are caught and found guilty, you are dismissed, not retired, and go home without benefits even if you had served for 50 years. If you steal, the same thing happens. The training tells you this is the way you do things here, the warrior system, not about I am right or you are wrong. If you do not want it that way, you can get out and do something else. 

So KDF is selling charcoal in cahoots with Al Shaabab? What kind of forum would you have with Al Shaabab to sit and discuss that? It’s impossible! Even as you struggle to do the right thing, you will always make enemies.

I gave you an example of Kismayu being the headquarters of all manner of illegal trade, including charcoal and sugar. There are people involved in that trade, even here in Kenya. In the course of doing our work, we upset these people.

All those allegations are pure propaganda by our detractors. We investigated every allegation and the same were investigated by other agencies and we never received any tangible, empirical evidence that any of our people behaved in a deviant manner.

Before deployment either for peace keeping or peace enforcement there is a lot of pre-deployment training that is carried out for troops, including the Dos and Don’ts. Therefore such allegations must be treated with the contempt they deserve. The KDF does not condone any breach of service regulations in the country, let alone in a foreign country. 

Critics always point to the numerous attacks in the country, including at Westage, in Garissa and Mpeketoni, to argue that Operation Linda Nchi was not successful.

Terrorism, however defined, is as old as mankind and there are many types of it. The kind of terrorism we are fighting traces its roots to 7th century AD, and until that religious ideological mental leaning is ended by deradicalisation, until they accept that not all mankind will be governed in the manner that they think, it will never end. It can only be managed.

Therefore you cannot say that since you have dealt with a particular group then the problem would not recur, so you cannot conflate our entry into Somalia with the attacks we have experienced. Even the terrorists cannot use the excuse of our entry to attack us because they were doing so even before we entered Somalia. 

The Koran is about peace but the extremists with twisted interpretation give Islam a bad name. 

All the attacks have taught us great lessons. The multi-agency approach we took has greatly helped us too. If we do not connect the dots in real time, we will be attacked again; 9/11 occurred in America because they did not connect the dots. 

After Westgate the KDF was accused of having bungled the operation.

That is absolute nonsense. I would not want to be identified with such a simplistic approach to such a delicate mater. The bottom line is that those terrorists were killed inside Westgate. But as the terrorist threat continues, the entire security sector gets even better with time and the concept of a multi-agency approach in order to connect the dots in a timely manner helps a lot. 

As CDF in 2013 you oversaw the transition from one Commander-in-Chief to another. Transitions are usually very tricky and the country is also at its most vulnerable. How did you handle it? What was going on behind the scenes that Kenyans may not have been aware of?

Well, the transition was a very smooth one. We did a good job. The law took its own course. We have a rule that we all follow and we also have to understand the boundaries of what the law says. The supreme law is the Constitution and the statutes crafted in it. You have to know that there are no rights that are absolute. You cannot just do what you want to do because you think that is democracy.

As a human being who loves this country, you do not want to see the 2007/8 violence again. We learned some lessons which we deployed in the 2013 transition. Some people do things because they think they have the right to do anything. You must be taken through the legal processes.

Any final word as we conclude?

You know we who have military backgrounds have been trained to be apolitical. Whoever Kenyans think they deserve, that is who they will vote in. Whoever wins the elections is the person who will be sworn in. I am a person with a conscience, I have an idea where I would love this country to go and how it can be properly managed, so I will vote. Because it is a secret ballot, I will vote for who I want to vote. That should be the mindset of the people in this county. 

Aspirants for whichever elective post must always move forward with the mindset that this country deserves the best, it is never personal, so that you produce a society that is balanced and can think together towards the welfare and the well-being of the Kenyan people, knowing that all these should be within the confines of the law. 

To Kenyans, our ethnic diversity must be seen as a strength rather than a weakness.