Nairobi talks fail to stop Museveni march

For four months starting in August, Kenya mediated a peace agreement between the then Ugandan rebels National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni and the military government of Gen Tito Okello. But the famous Nairobi Agreement that was meant to bring to an end hostilities and form a coalition government failed within weeks of its signing. ILLUSTRATION/JOHN NYAGAH

What you need to know:

  • Museveni had gone to the bush on account of rigged 1980 elections, while Gen Okello overthrew Milton Obote with a view of stemming the rebellion.
  • For instance, while Museveni was putting pen to paper in Nairobi, his troops took advantage of the lull during the negotiations to move in and capture Kampala.

For four months starting in August, Kenya mediated a peace agreement between the then Ugandan rebels National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni and the military government of Gen Tito Okello.

But the famous Nairobi Agreement that was meant to bring to an end hostilities and form a coalition government failed within weeks of its signing. Kenya, under President Daniel arap Moi, was keen to have peace in her western neighbour that had been at war since 1979, when Idi Amin was toppled by Tanzanian forces.

Then why did the agreement fail?

Experts, who were involved in the negotiations like former diplomat Bethuel Kiplagat, argue that the main causes were failure by the Kenyan negotiators to understand the parties and their motivations.

Museveni had gone to the bush on account of rigged 1980 elections, while Gen Okello overthrew Milton Obote with a view of stemming the rebellion.

The Okello team were after self-preservation as the rebels were gaining strength as they approached Kampala.

Museveni, on the other hand, was interested in power and he had detected that the Okello government had been weakened and was desperate. 

For instance, while Museveni was putting pen to paper in Nairobi, his troops took advantage of the lull during the negotiations to move in and capture Kampala.

Moi was not amused and this probably was the source of the mistrust between him and Museveni that went on for many years, until the revival of the East African Community in 1999.

Moi, who was just emerging from a coup attempt three years earlier, was keen to emerge as a regional leader, given that Gen Okello had approached the more respected Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who declined.

Furthermore, Museveni and the NRM were suspicious of Nyerere’s friendship with Obote.

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

The highlights of the agreement were: Complete and immediate cessation of hostilities, all parties shall forthwith stop the acquisition and procurement of arms, ammunition, and any other military hardware, and all the combatant forces shall nominate their representatives to be appointed to the Military Council, in accordance with the agreed numbers.

The parties included the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) — seven,  National Resistance Army (NRA) — seven,  Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) — one, Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU),  Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) — one, and  Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) — one, totalling 20.

But the agreement was never honoured as the war resumed within a week.

Kenya, in a hurry to be seen as a regional peacemaker, did not take into account other players like Burundi, Rwanda, and Libya, who were backing some of the parties and whose interests were not part of the agreement.

The NRA gave indications that they were not serious about the talks, missing some sessions and tabling new demands after the agenda had been moved forward.

On the other hand, the Okello government, contrary to the peace accord, was accused of flying several former Amin soldiers from Zaire and Sudan and from West Nile and integrating them into the national army.

PUBLICITY STUNT

Later in 2010, Kiplagat reflected that the Kenyan government lacked the in-depth understanding of the conflict, the key personalities involved, and the roles of other governments and external actors and, therefore, rushed into the signing of the agreement.

He wrote, “The mediators did not assess the internal power structure of the NRM/A.

They did not know the key figures or their views on the talks. Nor did they know whether the leaders were in full control of their fighters and therefore capable of ‘‘delivering’’ their constituencies to fulfil commitments made in any agreement...”

Analysts later observed that the NRM could have accepted the ceasefire to reorganise or portray a good image to the international community, an issue that the Moi team did not foresee.

Museveni took power in January 1986.

The Kenyan team was led by Moi as the chairman, then Vice-President Mwai-Kibaki, Justus ole Tipis, Elijah Mwangale, Nicolas  Biwott, Simeon Nyachae, then Chief Secretary, and Bethuel A. Kiplagat, then permanent secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Ugandan military government delegation was led by Gen Okello, chairman of the Military Council and Head of State, Lt General Bazilio Olara-Okello, Chief of Defence Forces, and Olara Otunnu, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The NRA group comprised Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, chairman, High Command, Dr Samson Kisekka, and Mr Eriya Kategaya.