How Tom Mboya pulled a fast one on Kadu days to self-rule

Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of Kanu, deplored regionalism and wanted immediate independence.

Kadu’s Ronald Ngala considered regionalism key to "practical democracy", and demanded that full independence should come at a later date. Ngala particularly feared the domination of smaller tribes by larger tribes in Kanu.

Because of Kadu’s fears, there were many detailed safeguards in the Majimbo constitution. A provision was made for an independent judiciary and an entrenched Bill of Rights.

Constitutional changes had to get a 75 per cent majority in each House. But in the case of entrenched tribal or individual rights, it had to be 90 per cent in the upper house.

Kanu leaders made concessions in the hope that they would get rid of them as soon as they formed internal self-government in June 1963. The suspicion and mistrust in the coalition government was evident as soon as the delegates returned to Nairobi in 1962.

At Kariokor, Tom Mboya, in a jibe targeted at Kadu, said, “If two of you buy a car but one of you doesn’t know how to drive, he can’t ask the other one why he always drives the car. You must learn to drive first before you buy the car, that is why Kanu agreed to join the coalition government.”

He also never hid his aim of eventually suppressing regionalism.

 “We see our position in the future as based on consolidating and strengthening the central machinery,” he said. “With the support of the country we will be in a position to remove or amend any and all parts of the constitution which are unworkable, expensive or hinder general progress.”

The coalition government effectively came to an end following the defeat of Kadu by Kanu in the May 1963 elections.

On the eve of the elections, Mboya had argued in an article that a win for Kanu would be a mandate for law review.

Just after the new government led by Jomo Kenyatta as prime minister was sworn in , Mboya, with Kenyatta’s blessings, approached Governor Malcolm MacDonald to facilitate his meeting with the Colonial Secretary to raise the issue of constitutional amendments and a date for independence.

The Colonial Secretary was, however, hesitant to meet Mboya, telegramming MacDonald, “Clearly Kenyan constitution is matter for discussion between all parties in Kenya and the British.

“In view of the above, I wonder whether it is really necessary for Mboya to come to London now. His visit will certainly raise anxieties among the Opposition Kadu, who would think he is working behind their back, while his lobbying at Westminster among MPs will make our task here more difficult.”

Instead of Mboya, the Colonial Secretary wanted Governor MacDonald to travel to London, “Might it not be wiser if instead of Mboya you yourself were to pay a short visit to London for consultations.” However, by the time the telegram was reaching the Governor, Kanu had already decided to send Mboya to London. As a result, Governor MacDonald informed the Colonial Secretary that a visit to London at the time Mboya was also visiting would raise suspicion among Kadu members.

“I do not think I should come to London during Mboya and his colleagues visit. This would arouse apprehension and criticism in various quarters here.”

Major amendments

Before travelling to London, Mboya tabled in the Cabinet two major amendments he deemed necessary to make the constitution workable.

One was the machinery for amending the constitution. According to extracts from minutes of the second Cabinet meeting held on June 12, 1963, Mboya argued that if the requirement of 90 per cent majority in the Senate and 75 per cent in the House of Representatives were to be reflected in the independence constitution, then that constitution would be immutable. This was because Kanu’ s majority was only 67 per cent in the House of Representatives and the party only controlled 21 seats out of 38 in the Senate.

The second related to declaration of a state of emergency. The constitution provided that an emergency could not be declared without the authority of 65 per cent of “all the members” of the National Assembly. He wanted “all the members” to be changed to “all the members present and voting”.

Mboya and his delegation arrived in London on June 10, 1963 and held discussions with the Colonial Secretary on June 15,1963. When the Colonial Secretary suggested that any proposal regarding constitutional amendments should include the views of Kadu, Mboya retorted that Kanu had won the election and therefore had the mandate to negotiate without involving Kadu.

Independence

After weeks of talks, the Colonial Secretary agreed to fix a date for independence, which was to be preceded by a constitutional conference attended by delegates from all the parties. However, Ngala refused to commit himself to any constitutional talks until the constitution that was in place was fully implemented.

He also accused the Governor and the Kanu government of sitting on powers, which under the constitution belonged to the regional governments. Responding to Ngala, Mboya said the opposition that was deliberately reluctant to accept its duties and responsibilities within a democratic set-up. “Is this not in fact the very attitude needed to support the case for a one party system?” he posed.

After great persuasion by the Colonial Office and the Governor, Ngala agreed to take part in constitutional talks that began at Government House in Nairobi, before all the delegates flew to London for the main conference.

The talks began in London on September 25, 1963, with Kenyatta making it plain that the constitution, with its heavy emphasis on regionalism, had proved rigid and unworkable, adding that this was further complicated by the “75-90 formula” on constitutional revision.

Central government

He insisted that the powers of the regions and tribes in Kenya be cut back and the authorities of the central government be restored. In contrast, Ngala limited himself to a single sheet of 20 lines, calling on her Majesty’s Government to “maintain her obligations and complete integrity in limiting constitutional changes to technical amendments in a narrow field”.

Three days later, the talks slipped into a series of deadlocks. At one point, the Colonial Secretary threatened to send all the delegates back to Kenya because their presence in London was costing a lot of money yet they had failed to agree.

On October 14, Kanu delegates also threatened to abandon the talks a after the Colonial Secretary refused to allow any more power to the central government. However, thanks to Governor MacDonald, who visited Kenyatta in his hotel room at Cumberland Hotel, Kanu delegates agreed to return to the talks.

After this the Colonial Secretary went behind Kadu’s back and drew up a new list of proposals which strongly favoured Kanu, before summoning all the delegates to Lancaster House.

The Colonial Secretary showed Kadu delegates the revised constitution as agreed between him and Kenyatta and told them it had the support of the British Cabinet, including Lord Home, the British Prime Minister.

The new agreement had watered down the powers of the regional councils and was promptly rejected by Ngala and his party Kadu, who termed it “the biggest betrayal in the history of British Colonialism”.

Ngala warned the Colonial Secretary to be ready to take responsibility for imposing constitutional changes on one of the two main political parties in Kenya in cahoots with the Kanu government.