Al-Shabaab militants in Elasha Biyaha, Somalia, on February 13, 2012.
When two clans in the northern Galgaduud region in Galmudug State in Central Somalia fought recently, the territory for grazing their livestock was the park of the quarrel.
Yet the rivalry between clans hailing from Herale town and Abudwak town, identified by their origins, rather than names, led to dozens of deaths between their fighters.
The dispute escalated last month when the militia from Herale town assembled anti-aircraft guns and threatened any airplane that could attempt to land at Abudwak airstrip, the main facility that links the town to other parts of the country.
“Any aircraft that attempts to land at Abudwak airport will do so at its own risk,” remarked a militia leader.
In Somalia, grazing lands, community settlements, and retaliations are an age-old thing, widespread, and often see fights within clans and between clans. It is the reason Somalia’s politics is largely clan-based, seeking to include as many representatives to buffer over feelings of marginalisation in states such as Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and the South West.
Sometimes confrontations occur between clans hailing from neighbouring states, the latest being Galmudug and Puntland, fueling tensions between the governments of the two states.
The timing of the fight last month had another effect: distracting clans from a common enemy, al-Shabaab.
After two years of concerted efforts between the Somali National Army and volunteer vigilante groups, some territories initially controlled by al-Shabaab had been won over. But the argument by critics has been often that those lands will fall back to al-Shabaab. Either that or how long the clan unity that fuels the vigilantes could last.
In August, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre had urged Islamic preachers to meet in Mogadishu to counter Al-Shabaab and ISIS Somalia, which the Somali government now labels as ‘deviants’ or khawaarij.
Barre addressed the clerics in the 2nd conference for Salafi clerics early in August, a grouping of clerics who believe they follow the most authentic form of Islam.
“Terrorists spread ignorance, distorted religion, foment bad culture, and create societies devoid of good values and short of leadership,” he said, asking the clergymen to establish cohesion among clans who produce the vigilantes.
Those clerics though face some kind of resistance from within clans.
Elmi Nur, an analyst in Mogadishu, said the clerics themselves have faced threats from sympathisers of the extremists.
“The current government aims to eliminate the extremists from Somalia by military might, economic suppression and by using moderate clerics’ preaching the correct manners,” Nur told Nation.
“However, I doubt whether they can succeed in talking about the evil deeds of the extremists,” added Nur, trusting that preachers at mosques cannot utter a thing about the terrorists, fearing for their security.
Inter-clan wars mean Somalia’s second pillar of attacking the ideology of extremists can be difficult, he argued.
Indeed, the government blames Al-Shabaab for manipulating clans and sowing hate in rural communities to fight each other, often siding with the weaker flank.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), an independent, non-profit agency, says Al-Shabaab exploits local disputes to deter security forces in Somalia.
Gains in the fight against Al-Shabaab in the campaign during 2022-23 have been undermined by political squabbles, internecine fighting, and widespread corruption, it says.
“Disputes often involve the distribution of resources between governing authorities and impact the mobilisation of clan-based militias (locally known as macawisleey),” ACLED reported on September 4.
“A row between authorities in Hirshabelle state and Hiiraan regional authorities in April 2023 illustrates,” it added, picking that as an example.
That dispute led to the withdrawal of security forces in Caad, Shabeelow, Camaara, Masagaway, Xinlabi, and Badaweyne villages in Mudug and Galgaduud regions,
“The withdrawal delayed the expansion of the counter-insurgency campaign to Jubaland and the South West states (labeled as Phase 2 of the campaign against Al-Shabaab),” ACLED further noted.
Negative developments in 2024 such as the strong reaction from the federal government of Somalia when Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the leader of the breakaway Somaliland leader Muse Bihi provoked tension in the Horn of Africa.
Ethiopia, according to the MoU, is to gain a 20 km coastal strip in Somaliland for 50 years in exchange for recognising Somaliland. The MoU has never been published by either side though.
Yet far from the tension itself, security officials worry it could break down cooperation against al-Shabaab. Gen Michael Langley, the Commander of the US Africa Command (Africom) admitted last week the actual operations on al-Shabaab had somewhat reduced since tensions began.
“There are limited operations with the Ethiopians at this time. Time will tell if they will settle their differences,” he told the VOA on October 1.
“Because when they do work together, they are very effective in clearing out al-Shabaab. One of the anchor, frontline countries, is Ethiopia. So that is what has me concerned. The liberation and stabilisation (of southwestern Somalia) have been valuable. So that is what has me concerned,” he said referring to Ethiopia’s operational sectors in Somalia.
ACLED recorded that the MoU provided Al-Shabaab and ISIS branches in Somalia to lure and actually recruit more followers to its ranks, contrary to Somalia’s efforts to terminate the extremists.
The radical groups, especially Al-Shabaab see both Egypt and Ethiopia as former and current allies of the FGS. It wants to crash and replace it to implement its strict version of the Islamic Sharia laws.
Meanwhile, Somalia is preparing for the exit of the African Union’s peacekeeping mission known as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), anticipating no Ethiopian participation in any future mission. Instead, Mogadishu is now banking on Egypt, whose coming has caused jitters among current troop-contributing countries on the composition of what will be known as the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission to Somalia (AUSSOM).
Within Somalia itself, the idea of expelling Ethiopians has caused squabbles between federal state leaders in South West state and parts of Jubbaland that prefer Ethiopia’s security support rather than Egypt.
But Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, Somalia’s Foreign Minister told the UN Security Council last week that Mogadishu will retain the absolute right to determine who it works within AUSSOM.
“The claim that Ethiopia is in Somalia to fight terrorism is a veil for their true intentions of occupation and annexation of Somali territory.
“The real motive behind the recent hostile attitude towards its neighbouring countries is an attempt to divert attention from its serious internal issues,” Fiqi said on Thursday, claiming Ethiopia had illegally made three arms shipments into Somalia in the last month.
