Members of the M23 rebel group gather to supervise Congolese potential recruits before being taken to training centres run by M23 rebels, amid clashes with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Goma, North Kivu province in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo on January 30, 2025.
This week, the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) reached a new high as a matter of peace and security of global concern. In the meantime, reports continued flowing in about dire situations in the civil war-wracked Sudan. These two theatres of conflict have drawn the US out of its American first policy only a few days after it was promulgated.
In eastern DRC, the rebel group, March 23 (M23), overran the provincial capital, Goma, killing at least 17 people among them UN peacekeeping forces. Massive displacements have been reported touching off a refugee, health, and famine crisis.
In Sudan, the initial number of 26,000 killed since the April 2023 commencement of the civil war has been adjusted to 61,000. Last week, the UN reported that about a million people have become internal or external refugees. A massive humanitarian crisis is unfolding with rampant cases of famine reported.
Where does the US come in in these wars?
The conflicts serve as a real-time reminder that the America First policy is not tantamount to Washington’s total disregard for wars in Africa. Within hours of the fall of Goma, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was on a call with DRC President Felix Tshisekedi “condemning” the “assault on Goma”.
Rubio made follow-up calls with Rwanda’s Paul Kagame – pressing for a ceasefire – and Kenya’s William Ruto to discuss US support for de-escalation of hostilities.
Rubio called the Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty on January 23 to discuss “the need to press the belligerents to end hostilities and expand humanitarian access.”
Coincidentally, President Ruto was hosted to a state visit by the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on Wednesday, January 29. One can speculate that the leaders of two countries seemingly in the good graces of Washington would have reflected on what the Donald Trump administration means for the continent.
Instructively, the two leaders signed a “Joint Declaration for a Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership” including a “Defence Cooperation Agreement”.
Kenya’s and Egypt’s roles in the DRC and Sudan provide a connecting thread reflective of the inevitability of US engagement in Africa despite the America First policy.
In these calls, there is the small matter of protocol. President Trump hasn’t called Mr Tshisekedi, Mr Kagame, Mr Ruto, or indeed any African leader since assuming office. This might seem mundane were it not for the symbolic significance it carries.
Customarily, new US presidents reach out to the leaders of strategic nations to signal some form of continued partnership.
Nonetheless, Secretary Rubio’s calls with Kinshasa, Kigali, Nairobi, and Cairo suggest that conflicts in strategic regions of Africa will remain on the cards.
What are the potential strategic objectives of the US diplomatic intervention in the DRC and Sudan? It is plausible that the US is intervening in the DRC – at least by way of Rubio’s diplomacy – as a responsible global power and no more. However, other factors are likely at play.
There are two regional blocs involved in the eastern DRC problem: the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Ostensibly, Rubio reached out to Kenya’s Ruto on the strength of his chairmanship of the EAC and leadership of the so-called Nairobi peace process. The DRC is a member of the EAC but has snubbed meetings and is effectively in the regional body only by name.
The SADC bloc has been spearheading the so-called Luanda process led by Angolan President Joao Lourenco. The DRC is in favour of the SADC-led SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), an AU-endorsed mission. Indeed, soldiers from South Africa and Malawi, troop-contributing countries, were killed as M23 advanced into Goma.
Why then did the US Secretary of State not, for example, engage presidents Joao Lourenco (Angola), Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa), and Lazarus Chakwera (Malawi)?
It is a long story, but answers may be found in the fact that US relations with South Africa – the southern African hegemon – are anything but close. US relations with Zimbabwean Emmerson Mnangagwa, Chairman of SADC, are hostile.
The parallel Nairobi-EAC and Luanda-SADC peace initiatives will be a big test for US diplomacy given the differing allegiances by the foes, Rwanda and the DRC, respectively.
In keeping with the America First policy, Secretary Rubio’s concerns in the DRC are probably aligned with American interests in the country. The US has invested in the natural resources sector for years, the latest being the $16 billion Lobito Corridor railway project linking the Port of Lobito in Angola to the mining fields in southern DRC.
Of particular importance are cobalt and lithium minerals. Both minerals are key components for the manufacture of electric vehicle batteries the manufacture of rechargeable batteries for electric vehicles, computers, cell phone parts, and airplane parts, among others.
A State Department statement on Rubio’s call with Kagame shows that Rubio was categorical on the need for Rwanda to back off from propping up the M23. Observers suppose the main political-security objective is that Rwanda is focused on managing Rwandan Hutus exiled in eastern Congo. Others suggest there are other natural resource appropriation and territorial expansion objectives that Rwanda is pursuing in the DRC.
Rwanda’s calculations seem to clash with US interests.
Against Rwanda’s alleged backing of the M23, Felix Tshisekedi’s DRC is on a back footing. In his call with Tshisekedi, Rubio indicated US support for DRC’s sovereignty. Essentially, the US is coming to the defence of a weak DRC. Reportedly, Kagame agreed to a ceasefire, a tactical retreat in the face of a warning from the powerful United States.
In Sudan, the US interests should be seen in the broader context of the Middle East. President Trump has close relations with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – even though these two countries are rival Gulf states. Egypt, an African Union member state supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces is an ally of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the Emiratis backs the Rapid Response Forces.
At the same time, the US relations are founded on trade deals with Saudi Arabia and UAE which cohere to the new US America First Trade policy.
It is a complex relationship in which Sudan, an eastern and Horn of Africa nation bordering the Red Sea is entangled. Many have concluded that Sudan is on the brink of a failed state if it is not already one. In his inaugural speech on January 20, President Trump indicated said he would lead the US into winning wars, ending wars, or not getting into wars.
Full transcripts of high-level diplomatic meetings such as the recent Rubio call with the Egyptian foreign minister, Abdelatty, are confidential. However, it is probable to surmise that the US is calculating to use Egypt, Sudan’s southern neighbour, to end the Sudanese war in a delicate balancing act involving Saudi Arabia and UAE.
In the wake of the beginnings of the America First policy, reactions and responses from Africa have morphed from initial shock to realism and strategy. The notion of African solutions to African problems and African agency has been invoked.
Yet, it is clear that the US will not entirely disappear from the scene when and where its allies and interests are at stake. African leaders need to factor in this reality while handling domestic and regional problems.
Dr Wekesa is Director, the African Centre for the Study of the United States, and a fellow at the University of Southern California and visiting professor at Howard University: [email protected]
