Though difficult, breaking away of part of a country can be achieved by negotiations

Anglophone Cameroonians in Bamenda protest against discrimination by the central government late last year. PHOTO | AFP

What you need to know:

  • Like South Sudan and Eritrea, the Bougainville secession from Papua New Guinea came at a heavy price of a decade-long war.

  • The world is generally averse to secession and does not explicitly provide legal and policy frameworks that would encourage it. 

  • In the case of Kenya, this ambiguity provides a fertile ground for conflict that is pitting anti and pro-secession forces against each other over divergent legal interpretations. 

Attempts at secession in Africa have faced huge challenges as the UN and the global community increasingly become anti-breakaway and mother states dig in and become ruthlessly militaristic.

This has hampered secessionist efforts of even those that have similar political history to Eritrea, including Somaliland and former British South Cameroon, now part of ex-French Cameroon.

The latter proclaimed independence of  Ambazonia — the name given to the two breakaway Anglophone regions of Cameroon — on October 1, 2017, provoking a crackdown by security forces that left dozens dead and many injured.

Like South Sudan and Eritrea, the Bougainville secession from Papua New Guinea came at a heavy price of a decade-long war. 

The war of 1988 to 1998 between Papua New Guinea and the secessionist forces of the Bougainville is billed as the largest conflict in Oceania since the end of World War II. It left an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Bougainvilleans dead.

HOSTILITIES

Hostilities ended following a 1998 peace agreement between the Papuan Government and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. 

Under the deal, officials agreed to the founding of the Autonomous Bougainville Government and to cede certain rights and authorities to the province, including outlying small islands. A referendum for the independence of ABG is scheduled for 2019.

The world is generally averse to secession and does not explicitly provide legal and policy frameworks that would encourage it. 

The ambiguity in international law on the provision of self-determination on the one hand and the principle of territorial integrity on the other, therefore, creates the first challenge in attempts to secede. 

Like the UN, most national constitutions do not directly provide for secession, given the high premium that states place on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Where such a constitutional provision exists, it is likely to suffer from the same ambiguity as the UN Charter, as it seeks to balance individual with statehood rights.

AMBIGUITY

In the case of Kenya, this ambiguity provides a fertile ground for conflict that is pitting anti and pro-secession forces against each other over divergent legal interpretations. 

Whereas our Constitution outlaws secession by emphatically providing in the preamble that Kenya is “…one indivisible sovereign nation,” and underscoring in Article 5 “the inviolable territorial limits of Kenya as a sovereign republic”, pro-secessionists argue that Articles 1 and 2 provide that “sovereign power belongs to the people” and may be exercised directly — self-determination — or indirectly.

Even so, the parent state still retains an upper hand; in part because it enjoys international recognition of its inalienable statehood. Furthermore, any action challenging the constitutional status quo in regard to Kenya as one sovereign republic within the territorial limits outlined in Article 5, would require an amendment through a referendum. 

Still, to actualise a plebiscite would require a dominant ruling regime’s cooperation, a most unlikely scenario given the government’s abhorrence of part of its territory breaking away. 

WESTERN SAHARA

The combined emphasis on territorial integrity, domestically and internationally, ensures secessionist movements often fail to galvanise the world to pile pressure on the parent government to grant autonomy, as the case of Kosovo demonstrates. 

While Kosovo enjoys the backing of the United States and most industrialised countries, it has not been recognised by the UN and is unlikely to be as long as Russia — a veto-wielding member of the Security Council — does not recognise Kosovo’s  2008 declaration of independence from Moscow’s ally, Serbia.

Even where a separatist group qualifies to break away on the basis of the principle of self-determination, political and legal recognition may be denied on other grounds.

Such is the case of Western Sahara, formerly a Spanish colony, which remains a disputed territory, claimed by Morocco and the Polisario Front.

It is listed by the UN as a non-decolonised territory and included in the UN list of non-self-governing territories.

However, the UN neither recognises Moroccan nor Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic sovereignty over Western Sahara.  

Despite this, 87 states, the Non-Aligned Movement, the African Union and the European Union support “the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi people”.

DISPUTE

However, of these, 42 States do not recognise the Sahrawi Republic while only 35 do. Furthermore, while the Organisation of African Unity admitted Western Sahara as a member in 1984 — a decision that created a rift in the union and caused the exit of Morocco — only 21 African States recognise Western Sahara. 

Despite the fact that the dispute that triggered its exit from the union still remains, the return of Morocco in January 2017 after 33 years may augur well for continental unity. 

Spain’s wealthy north-eastern Catalonia region has grabbed international media attention for years as one of the most likely newest member of the secessionist family.

But this has not come to pass, primarily due to the heavy anti-secessionism tide from the government in Madrid and lack of UN and international support.

The Spanish constitution, too, does not provide for secession.

Catalonia, which considers itself different from the rest of Spain, has since the 19th century, struggled  to break away, but has faced resistance from Madrid, which relies heavily on the region’s economy for its national revenue. 

ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES

Fuelled by a distinct language and culture as well as historical economic grievances, aspirations for a separate state for Catalonia have been simmering for generations, culminating in the October 1, 2017, referendum that saw Catalonians voting for secession and the establishment of  their capital in Barcelona. 

This was followed with the declaration by the Catalonian regional parliament and of Catalonia’s independence from Spain on October 27. 

It was in complete defiance of multiple warnings from the central government of the unconstitutionality of secession. 

The Spanish Senate granted Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy unprecedented powers to impose direct rule on Catalonia. 

With this constitutional backing, the premier took the unprecedented step of stripping the region of its autonomy, dismissing its government — including the Catalan police chief — and dissolving the regional parliament. 

He also called for snap elections for the region on December 21, 2017, and vowed to close down Catalan embassies. 

CATALONIA

Rajoy then began a crackdown and arrest of Catalonian leaders.  Carles Puigdemont was sacked as Catalan president and charged with sedition and rebellion, but sought refuge in the Belgian capital Brussels.

His former deputy and other Catalan leaders are in jail pending investigations into the same charges. 

However, the December 21 snap elections turned out to be a victory for pro-secessionist parties. They defeated the central government despite the centrist, anti-independence party scoring the best individual result. The European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany and the US declined support for Catalan independence and expressed backing for Madrid’s right to preserve Spanish unity. 

Like Catalonia, Chechnya was a cash cow of the Russian Federation. It served as a hub of the oil infrastructure and so its secession would hurt the Russian economy and energy access. 

The Chechen-Russian conflict dates back to the 18th century. In the ensuing years, the territory was locked in a struggle between successive Russian governments and Chechen factions seeking independence.

During the Russian Civil War of 1917 to 1922, Chechens and other Caucasian nations gained independence before being re-Sovietised in 1921.

SECOND WORLD WAR

During the Second World War, Chechens attempted another revolt against the Soviet regime but the militants were deported en masse to Central Asia where they remained until 1957, four years after Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s death. 

As the Soviet Union disintegrated after the end of the Cold War, Chechen separatists declared independence in 1991. 

The Russian-Chechen war broke out in late 1994 and after two years of fighting, Russian forces withdrew but returned in 1999 to re-establish control over Chechnya in 2000.

The final round of the war was from 1999 to 2009 as Chechnya continued resistance against Russian political control.

The intensification of the war and especially the widespread human rights violations by Russian and separatist forces drew international condemnation. 

By April 2009, the Russian operation officially ended. The troops withdrew from Chechnya and three months later, the exiled leader of the separatist government called for a halt to armed struggle.

According to estimates, between 25,000 and 50,000 people were killed or disappeared during the bloody conflict, civilians accounting for the majority.

To secede or not to secede?

POLITICAL SUICIDE

As demonstrated, it is rare for internationally-recognised states to agree to allow the breakaway of part of their territory.

To many state bureaucrats, such a concession amounts to political suicide. Yet, as shown, the often hardline anti-secessionist stance tends to generate and evoke more radicalised and militant reactions from secessionist groups, which then escalates into an armed conflict. 

Clearly, there can be no winners in such a war. It only leaves a trail of death and destruction.

It would seem, therefore, that the first line of action where feelings of historical injustice have been expressed would be for the government and the aggrieved to seek dialogue rather than confrontation.

The aim is usually to reach a reasonable compromise. However, if dialogue fails and it becomes clear that the differences are irreconcilable, then a negotiated and peaceful exit of the aggrieved party should be considered.

 Maria Nzomo is professor of international relations and governance and director of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, the University of Nairobi. She is a former ambassador of Kenya to the UN and WTO.