Of Kibaki, Moi and why time is Ruto’s best friend that no deep state can stop

President Uhuru Kenyatta

President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto with former President Mwai Kibaki when they called on him at his Nyari office, Nairobi on October 18, 2014.

Photo credit: File | PSCU

What you need to know:

  • There is an uncanny similarity in the career trajectories of the Big Three identified last week: Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki and William Ruto.
  • At the decisive point, Moi proved precocious, rising to the vice-presidency at 43, while Ruto and Kibaki were 47.

Last week I used historical data to formulate a proposition that may be helpful in evaluating the prospects of various aspirants in the second Kenyatta Succession.

In the process, I was able to show that the presidential potential of various former vice-presidents was far from accidental, yet at the same time virtually immune to the subversive contrivances of the so-called deep state, or government/state machinery.

Competent presidential administrations or tickets select the deputy or running mate on the basis of hard-nosed coalition-making calculations.

A key fallacy of presidential discourse is to regard the vice or deputy president as inconsequential or inert. This is where it all goes wrong.

Under conditions of explicit political competition, the vice-presidential choice signals serious intent, and the incumbent therefore comes into play as a serious actual or potential player in presidential politics. Let us call this attribute ‘initial political capital’.

During the term of any administration, the second-in-command is so positioned as to inevitably enhance their political capital significantly.

An active, visible vice-president escalates their rate of political capital almost exponentially. Obviously, the tenure of the presidency, or at any rate, the term of the vice-president is a fundamental variable.


At the end of a vice-presidency, therefore, a politician’s prospects of succeeding their boss should have improved according to the duration of their tour as well as their industry. Their stature will be a function of their initial political capital – that combination of attributes that made them the compelling choice for effective coalition building in the first place – as well as the potential political capital accruing from their ascension, unlocked by diligent application over time.

The urge to put down an equation at this point is as strong as the fear of my editor.

The vice-presidents who made it to the presidency both commanded strong national constituencies and served for a decade.

They were also highly visible and mobile deputies. Despite complicated dynamics with their bosses, and tireless exertions of the ‘state machinery’ to thwart their progress, each ultimately succeeded their bosses.

That is not all there is to it, however.

There is an uncanny similarity in the career trajectories of the Big Three identified last week: Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki and William Ruto.

All made their parliamentary debut at the same age. Moi was 31 in 1955 when he joined the LegCo, and Kibaki was 32 in 1963 while Ruto was 31 in 1997. They became ministers at similar ages (Moi at 37, Kibaki at 35 and Ruto at 34).

At the decisive point, Moi proved precocious, rising to the vice-presidency at 43, while Ruto and Kibaki were 47.

Parliamentary route

Indeed, Kibaki and Ruto’s careers match almost identically in certain additional dimensions. Both left the university (Kibaki as a lecturer at 29, Ruto as a graduate student at 26) to work for Kanu. As already indicated, each entered government through the parliamentary route at similar ages, and became assistant ministers at the age of 32.

Further, they both acquired full ministerial appointment at similar ages (35 and 34) and became vice or deputy president at 47. The biographical dimension of political capital is an attractive subject for deeper investigation.

Most importantly for this analysis, Moi and Kibaki took over from the men they deputised for a decade.

Whether they enjoyed cordial, affectionate, indeterminate or rancorous relations with their bosses remains controversial, but in each case, the fact that the bosses may have had other heirs in mind doesn’t seem to have affected their prospects.

Moreover, presidential history abundantly documents official and arguably top-level machinations through the state apparatus to thwart these men’s momentum. This too came to naught.

A long-serving, visible, active vice-president with a national constituency is not only deep state-proof: change-the-constitution and other stop-whoever movements are deceptive, divisive and self-destructive enterprises.

After a certain point, time is the deputy’s best friend, and no state machinery can stop time.

Political mischief

To the kamati ya roho chafu, Ruto’s case is especially vexing since he is constitutionally insured from political mischief.

Even before the 2013 election, he was an irresistible proposition for any serious presidential ticket, firmly on the fast track to the presidential big league.

Only Raila Odinga had the foresight to judge the best time to put paid to Ruto’s presidential ambition: well before the 2013 election, and, in fact, as early as 2009.

That Ruto survived the blistering onslaught of a Prime Minister at the peak of his powers should provide some perspective.

The other miserable idea that must be retired with haste is the absurd supposition that the deputy president is purely parasitic on the President.

This is implied in the expectation that removing the Deputy President from office automatically leads to their fatal political atrophy.

Mwai Kibaki alighted from the vice-presidential perch in 1988, and exited government altogether in 1991, yet retained sufficient stamina to put him ahead of the pack over a decade later – in 2002.

Mr Ng’eno is an advocate of the High Court and former State House speech writer. @EricNgeno